Between the Supreme Federal Court and the National Congress:

The Institutional Dispute Over the Control of the Political Financing Modelin Brazil (2015–2017)

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.9732/

Keywords:

Institutional change; National Congress; Supreme Federal Court; Electoral reform; Campaign financing.

Abstract

This article analyzes the strategic performance of the Brazilian National Congress during the mini electoral reforms of 2015 and 2017, focusing on its control over the institutional change in electoral campaign financing. The central hypothesis is that, following the Supreme Federal Court’s decision in Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADI) No. 4,650—which prohibited corporate donations—the Legislature acted to preserve its pre-existing political advantages. The research employs documentary analysis and quantitative methods, using hierarchical multivariate linear regression applied to data from the Superior Electoral Court (TSE) concerning elections for the Federal Chamber of Deputies from 2002 to 2022. The results indicate that, although compelled to accept the reform, Congress managed to transform it into an opportunity to centralize public funding within political parties and incumbent candidates. This strategy reinforced the dominance of political elites and widened asymmetries in electoral competition. It is concluded that the plutocratic model once sustained by corporate donations was reconfigured and reproduced under a new institutional form, revealing the adaptive capacity of political actors in the face of institutional change.

Author Biographies

  • Gustavo Nascimento Torres, Federal University of Paraná

    Professor da Universidade Federal do Delta do Parnaíba (UFDPar). Doutor em Direito (PPGD-UFPR), Mestre em Direito (PPGD-UFPI), Pós-Graduado em Direito Constitucional (CEUT-PI), Graduado em Direito (ICF-PI) e Comunicação Social – Jornalismo (UFPI). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7890-3638.

  • Luiz Fernando Zelinski, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina

    Pós-Doutorando em Ciências Políticas (UFSC), Doutor em Ciências Políticas (PPGCP-UFR), Mestre em Ciências Políticas (PPGCP-UFPR), Graduado emGestão Pública (UFPR). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5757-8239.

  • Ivan Jairo Junckes, Federal University of Paraná

    Professor da Universidade Federal do Paraná (UFPR). Pós-Doutor no King College London (UK), Pós-Doutor na Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM-ESP), Doutor em Sociologia Política (UFSC), Mestre em Sociologia Política (UFSC). ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8305-3754.

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Published

2026-11-09

Issue

Section

Artigos

How to Cite

Between the Supreme Federal Court and the National Congress:: The Institutional Dispute Over the Control of the Political Financing Modelin Brazil (2015–2017). (2026). Brazilian Journal of Political Studies, 132(1), 17-56. https://doi.org/10.9732/